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A substantial body of empirical works document that exchange rate pass-through to con-
sumer prices is incomplete. This evidence has cast doubts on the ability of ￿ exible exchange
rates to generate expenditure switching. In a dynamic stochastic discrete-time duopoly
game, non-price competition among ￿rms endogenously originates a degree of exchange rate
pass-through close to zero together with an expenditure switching e⁄ect stronger than in
the standard models.
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In the last few years the empirical literature has shown that exchange rate pass-through to
consumer prices is close to zero in the short run, and far to be complete in the long run.1 The
degree of exchange rate pass-through is a crucial variable for explaining the role of exchange
rates in the process of external adjustment. A limited degree of pass-through can dampen
the expenditure switching e⁄ect of exchange rate changes on trade volumes, as it forestalls
movements in relative trade prices. In this occurrence, a variation of the nominal exchange
rate will not orient the demand in favor of the depreciated currency goods, disallowing a trade
balance adjustment. A part of the literature indicates that since prices are set in the importer
country currency expenditure switching does not occur.2 A part suggests that even if prices do
not adjust at consumer level, they do at producer level, and that exchange rate promotes at
producer level expenditure switching.3 Even if the degree of pass-through is very low, a number
of empirical works document that exchange rate changes do indeed redirect global expenditure.4
In the model proposed in this paper I account for unresponsive prices to exchange rates together
with expenditure switching.
This model investigate the relation between exchange rate pass-through and expenditure
switching, assuming that ￿rms can compete in price and in non-price dimensions. Building on
Hotelling (1929), products are de￿ned as a triple of characteristics, price, and a "types". It is
assumed that consumers are heterogenous in the evaluation of types, and homogenous in the
evaluation of characteristics. More speci￿cally, for a given price, all consumers prefer higher
characteristics content, but they di⁄er in their evaluation of the types.5 A foreign and a domestic
￿rm compete in a duopoly framework. The domestic ￿rm￿ s price and costs are expressed in the
same currency. The foreign ￿rm, instead sets the price in the local market currency, but sustains
costs in a di⁄erent currency. This feature exposes the market to the ￿ uctuations of the exchange
rate. In particular, in a ￿ exible price framework, if products￿characteristic cannot be changed,
an exchange rate depreciation of the domestic bilateral exchange rate increases foreign ￿rm costs
expressed in domestic currency, increasing its prices and decreasing its market shares.6 The
foreign ￿rm, in order to insulate its pro￿ts from exchange rate ￿ uctuations, can ￿nd pro￿table
to change its costs, this can be done by changing the characteristics of the product supplied
in the domestic market. This intervention can take both the form of substituting the product
with a new one that has a smaller content of characteristics, or can take the form of changing
some features of the existing product.
The way in which the two ￿rms operate in the market can be described using a two stage
game; ￿rst ￿rms compete in characteristics, then they compete in prices. The price competition
is a static game of complete information, since in each period both ￿rms observe the realization
of the exchange rate shock, and because current prices do not have any e⁄ect on future demand
or pro￿ts. The characteristic choice, the non-price competition, is instead a dynamic game,
1See among others Crucini, Telmer and Zachariadis (2001), Engel and Rogers (1996), Campa and Goldberg
(2002, 2006).
2See for example Devereux and Engel (2003), Engel (2002).
3See among others Corsetti and Dedola (2003), Burstein, Neves and Rebelo (2003), Obstfeld (2001).
4For an overview see among others Krugman (1991).
5Supposing that bicycles are the products of this economy: valuable characteristic is represented by the metal
used in production, and the type by their model (for example race bikes, mountain bikes, etc...).
6Notice that in a duopoly setting, when the costs of one of the two ￿rms increase, both ￿rms increase their
prices, but the ￿rm that has the costs shock increases the price more than its competitor.
2since any time the product varies from the previous period, ￿rms must pay an adjustment cost
that is assumed to be invariant through time. Given the structure of the problem it is possible
to de￿ne a unique Markov-Perfect equilibrium that is also a rational expectation equilibrium:
the beliefs of a ￿rm about its competitor characteristics in equilibrium are correct and equal to
the true amount of characteristics chosen by the competitor.
The main result of the model is that even when the degree of exchange rate pass-through
is low, expenditure switching do occur. When a depreciation of the domestic currency hits the
economy, the amount of characteristics of the foreign product reduces while its price increases
by less than in the standard duopoly models. Expenditure switching occurs even if exchange
rate pass-through is moderate. The size of the expenditure switching is even bigger than in the
standard duopoly models: this result comes from the fact that demand adjust along price and
product characteristic dimension.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sections (2) provides an overview of the
empirical evidence relevant to the paper. Section (3) describes the model. Section (4) explains
the game. Section (5) describes the results. Section (6) concludes.
2 Motivating Evidence
This section is dedicated to a brief review of the macroeconomic literature that document the
reaction of imports and exports to exchange rate variations, and to the marketing literature
that document non-price competition behaviors.
2.1 Exchange Rate Variation and Expenditure Switching
In the international macroeconomic literature, the scarce responsiveness of prices to the ex-
change rate, has cast doubts on the capacity of the exchange rate variations to generate ex-
penditure switching, that is, the ability of the exchange rate variations to orient the product
demand in favor of the goods whose currency has been depreciated.
In reality, there is evidence that exchange rate changes do indeed redirect global expenditure,
though perhaps with lags. Faruqee (2006) ￿nds that in the European countries, even if local
currency pricing and pricing to market behavior are in place, expenditure switching e⁄ects still
operate. In particular, Faruqee ￿nds evidence that exchange rate depreciations, redirecting the
demand in favor of the depreciated currency goods, improves the trade balance.
Freund (2000) studies 21 industrialized countries ￿nding evidence on the importance of
nominal exchange rate variations for current account adjustment.
Debelle and Galati (2005) analyze 21 industrialized countries for the period that goes from
1974 to 2003, ￿nding that the exchange rate variations contribute signi￿cantly to the process
of adjustment of the current account imbalances.
Finally, Krugman (1991) presents a wide overview of evidence that support the expenditure
switching e⁄ect through around 1990.
2.2 Non-price Competition
The evidence of non-price competition used as optimal reaction to shocks by ￿rms, is widely
documented in the marketing literature.
3Rocko⁄ (1984) studies the price control in the U.S. from the WWII; the author ￿nds that
price controls held nominal price of several consumers goods to be constant, with a contempo-
raneous deterioration of the goods￿quality in response to change in the market prices.
Rotemberg (2005) cites that the October 1994 issue of Consumers Reports discusses a change
in the design of the packages for G￿tterman thread. The company made its plastic spools fatter
so that, when ￿lled with 110 yards of thread, they would have the same outside dimensions than
a previous version of 220 yards of thread. The price of the newer version was $1.25 while the
previous was $1.45. In the same issue of the Consumers Reports it is declared that Minute Maid
signi￿cantly reduced the concentration of its 12 oz can of Raspberry Lemonade while keeping
the price constant. The ￿rm, questioned on this action, explained that this product variation
was motivated by cost increases that would otherwise raise the price.
Koelln and Rush (1993), on a period that goes from 1950 to 1989, collect data of the "text
pages" and prices for seven magazine in the U.S. The authors identify the possibility of altering
the number of pages of text as a potential means of o⁄setting declines in real price during
the interval between price changes. Koelln and Rush note that the magazine with the most
in￿ exible size over this period also had by far the largest number of nominal price changes.
They interpret this result as supporting the hypothesis that variation in valuable characteristic
is a potential important alternative in changing the price. The authors ￿nd also a statistical
signi￿cant positive relationship between the number of text pages in a magazine and the real
price of the magazine. That is, as in￿ ation erodes the real price of a magazine during the
interval between nominal price changes, the number of text pages tend to decline.
In the study of Blinder et al. (1989) , ￿rms are asked directly about their pricing behavior;
a sample of two hundreds managers and price setters of the Northeastern United States were
asked to rank or assign scores to a number of twelve popular economic theories which were
explained to them in non-technical terms. The results show that across sector of the economy
the theory of "non-price competition" belongs to the top group scores being the third most used
way to keep price constant.
With the de￿nition "non-price competition" are named di⁄erent behavior as using delivery
lags, change product quality, change terms of service, or make a di⁄erent selling e⁄ort. When
the results are divided by sector, non-price competition is the ￿rst method used by ￿rms to
avoid changes in prices in the manufacturing sector, the second in the trade sector, the third in
the service sector. Quoting Blinder et al.:
￿... many ￿rms appear to leave prices ￿xed in the face of shocks because they
prefer to use one or more avenues of nonprice competition to adjust. Rather than
cut prices in the face of sagging demand, ￿rms can and do shorten delivery lags,
raise product quality, improve term of service, or make greater selling e⁄orts. Non-
price competition raises both microeconomic and macroeconomic questions that have
barely been addressed by theorists. Why do ￿rms prefer nonprice competition to
price competition even though the former appears to entail real resource costs that
the latter avoids? What are the welfare implications of markets that clear along non-




In the market two ￿rms produce two di⁄erentiated products characterized by the triple (si;t;
pi;t; xi;t).
xi;t represents the ￿type￿of the product and is de￿ned as a peculiarity perceived as relevant
by consumers, but which does not a⁄ect product￿ s costs (an example of a product￿ s type is its
color). The type xi;t is de￿ned on a support that ranges between 0 and 1. This index can be
represented on a segment of unit length in which ￿rms and consumers are located. It is assumed
that through time the positions of the ￿rms along the segment is given and equal to the extreme
points of it, and that the consumers are distributed uniformly along the segment.
si;t represents the amount of valuable ￿characteristics￿ presents in the product and it is
de￿ned as a feature on which all consumers agree over the preference ordering: for a given
price and a given type, the product with a higher amount of characteristics is preferred by each
consumer (an example of characteristics is the product￿ s raw material). Di⁄erently from the
type, the characteristic is positively related both to variable and ￿x ￿rms￿costs. si;t and xi;t
are assumed to be independent in order to focus the analysis in the case in which there are not
interactions between the two features of the product. Finally pi;t; de￿nes the price of the good.
3.2 Consumers
Consumers are fully characterized by their location x in the segment [0;1]: They are thus
heterogenous in the evaluation of the type and homogenous in the characteristics evaluation.7
I assume that consumers￿utility is decreasing in the distance between the good￿ s type xi and
x; decreasing in the price of the product pi, and increasing in its characteristics si. Consumers
behavior is static and demand is unitary. At every period t; consumers have full information on
the characteristics and price level of the two ￿rms, and decides whether to buy or not a unit of
a good, and from which ￿rm to buy it. The utility of consumer x that buy good i at time t is
thus:
ui;t = k + si;t ￿ pi;t ￿ ￿ jx ￿ xij
where ￿ jx ￿ xij represents the consumer￿ s transportation costs, and ￿ is the unit transportation
costs. The utility of the outside alternative, i.e. not purchasing the good, is normalized to zero.
A consumer purchases a unit of good i if ui;t ￿ 0 and if ui;t ￿ u￿i;t. I assume that
ui;t ￿ 0 always holds, that is the market is always covered. I can rewrite the above condition
as k + si;t ￿ pi;t + ￿ jx ￿ xij from which clearly it can be seen that a consumer buys the good
as long as the e⁄ective price, represented by the good￿ s price plus the transportation costs, is
less than the characteristics amount supplied.
I derive now the time invariant consumers￿ demands for each product; I omit the time
subindex for notation clarity. Let b x 2 [0; 1] denote the location of the consumer that is indif-
7In the textbook version of the vertical product di⁄erentiation, when consumers are homogenous in the
evaluation of the characteristics, if two di⁄erent characteristics are supplied, all consumers always prefer high
characteristics if they purchase at all (see Tirole 1988). This means that the low characteristics product is domi-
nated. In my formulation instead, since consumers are concerned also about the type of the good, in equilibrium
it is possible to observe di⁄erent characteristics without involving consumers heterogeneity in characteristics
evaluation.
5ferent between purchasing from ￿rm i and ￿rm ￿i. Thus:
si ￿ pi ￿ ￿ jb x ￿ xij = s￿i ￿ p￿i ￿ ￿ jb x ￿ x￿ij (1)
since xi = 0; and x￿1 = 1, solving equation (1) for b x provides:








In the market a ￿domestic￿and a ￿foreign￿￿rm compete. I de￿ne as domestic the ￿rm whose
costs and prices are expressed in the same currency (the so called domestic currency), while I
de￿ne as foreign the ￿rm who sets prices in domestic currency, but whose costs are expressed in
a di⁄erent currency. The foreign ￿rm costs are converted in the domestic currency through the
nominal bilateral exchange rate. The nominal bilateral exchange rate is a stochastic variable
that evolves according to a Markov process equal to:
et = e
￿
t￿1 exp"t where "t ￿ N(0;￿2
") (3)
Its realization is common knowledge to ￿rms and consumers, and is future realization is the
only source of uncertainty of the economy. For a given amount of characteristics, a deprecia-
tion (appreciation) of the exchange rate increases (decreases) foreign ￿rm￿ s costs expressed in
domestic currency, but does not a⁄ect those of the domestic ￿rm. A variation of the nominal
bilateral exchange rate thus leads to ￿ uctuations of the relative costs of the two ￿rms. It is
assumed, however, that ￿rms can insulate relative costs ￿ uctuations due to exchange rate vari-
ations changing the goods￿content of characteristics. This behavior can be described using the
a stationary discrete-time in￿nite horizon game, that I explain in the following section.
4 The Game
Time is discrete. Every period t ￿rms observe the realization of the exchange rate shock. Given
this information, in each period t ￿rms choose the amount of characteristics and compete in
prices. The Bertrand game is static because current prices do not have any e⁄ect on future
demand or pro￿ts. The equilibrium prices of the Bertrand game resulting determine the equi-
librium pro￿ts for each ￿rm at time t as a function of the amount of characteristics they choose.
Firms decide simultaneously the amount of characteristics that maximize their pro￿ts given
the optimal response of the competitor. This choice is dynamic because it is assumed that
every time ￿rms change the characteristics with respect to the previous period, they sustain an
additional quadratic cost of adjustment. The dynamics of the model are thus generated by the
exogenous stochastic process of the nominal bilateral exchange rate, and by the choices of the
products￿characteristics over time.
4.1 Price Competition: the Spot Market
In this subsection I omit the time subindex for notational simplicity. Every period ￿rms compete
in prices. This price competition game is a static game of complete information. Firms maximize
pro￿ts taking as given the value of the nominal bilateral exchange rate and both their own and
6their competitor￿ s previous period characteristics level. In order to restrict the analysis on the
duopoly outcome the following assumption must hold:
A.1 8s 2 S; jCi(si;e) ￿ C￿i(s￿i;e) + s￿i ￿ sij < 3￿;
where Ci(si;e) (C￿i(s￿i;e)) represents ￿rm i (￿i) marginal costs that are function of the
own characteristics amount and the nominal bilateral exchange rate e. If assumption (A.1)
holds the marginal costs of the two ￿rms are not too di⁄erent relative to the consumers￿unit
transportation costs ￿. Indeed if Ci(si;e) > C￿i(s￿i;e) ￿ (s￿i ￿ si) + 3￿ ￿rm i would have too
high marginal cost with respect to ￿rms ￿i for competing in that market. It also states that
8s we can observe the duopoly outcome, that is, there does not exist a characteristics level for
which one of the two ￿rms has an absolute advantage such that the ￿rm can be the monopolist
for that given characteristics amount. Since in the dynamic game ￿rms choose the level of
characteristics and therefore their marginal costs, at that stage it must checked that the ￿rms
endogenously choose levels of characteristics that satisfy assumption (A.1). In appendix (B) I
show that this indeed will be the case for each given level of characteristics s.
Given assumption (A.1) I can de￿ne the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium of the static game:
Proposition 1 Suppose assumption (A.1) holds, then ￿rm i and ￿i play a duopoly price com-











3￿ + C￿i(s￿i;e) ￿ Ci(si;e)
6￿
￿i(e;s￿i;si) =
(si ￿ s￿i + 3￿ + C￿i(s￿i;e) ￿ Ci(si;e))
2
18￿
Proof. Each ￿rm maximizes pro￿ts taking the price of the other ￿rm as given. It follows












Each ￿rm maximizes its pro￿t by choosing its best-response price. The best-response of ￿rm i
is characterized by the ￿rst order condition:






that combined with the reaction function of the competitor delivers the equilibrium prices, and
hence the quantities and the pro￿ts stated in Proposition 1.
For each level of characteristics in the characteristics state space I ￿nd a unique Bertrand-
Nash equilibrium given by that described in Proposition 1.
4.2 Non-Price Competition: the Dynamic Analysis
4.2.1 The Primitives
The interaction among the two ￿rms in the dynamic setting can be described using a set of
primitives which are common knowledge to the two ￿rms:
f(S;S);(E;E);￿;￿;￿i(e;s￿i;si);Ri(si;￿1;;s￿i;e;si);e;￿g
7(S;S) and (E;E) are measurable spaces of possible values for the endogenous and exogenous
state variables, s and e, respectively; in particular:
A.4 s 2 S ￿ R+; e 2 E ￿ R+;
A.5 S is a convex Borel set in R2
+, with its Borel subsets S;
The state space is ￿ = S￿S￿E ￿ R+￿R+￿R+, ￿ : ￿ ! S is a correspondence describing
the feasibility constraint, it is assumed that:
A.6 ￿ is nonempty, compact valued, and continuos;
￿i(e;s￿i;si) gives the payo⁄ or pro￿t of a ￿rm from its current production and sales activi-
ties. It re￿ ects the equilibrium in the spot market, and is equal to the equilibrium pro￿t of the
￿rm￿ s static problem stated in Proposition 1. It is assumed that characteristics can be changed
in each period, but any time characteristics vary from the previous period, ￿rms must pay an
adjustment cost B that is assumed to be invariant through time. In each period the objective
function of each ￿rm is therefore given by the optimal pro￿t derived in the price competition in
Proposition 1, minus the ￿x costs associated with the characteristics level, minus the quadratic
adjustment cost associated with the characteristics variation; that is:
Ri(si;￿1;s￿i;e;si) = ￿i(e;s￿i;si) ￿ Ai(si) ￿ B(si ￿ si;￿1)2:
for each e 2 E I assume that Ri(si;￿1;s￿i;e;si) is strictly concave. This speci￿cation of the
one period return allows to obtain a unique steady state equilibrium. In particular the term
Ai(si) guaranties the intersection of the reaction functions of the two ￿rms with respect to
characteristics; ￿nally ￿ is the common discount factor of the two ￿rms in the model that:
A.7 ￿ 2 (0;1);
4.2.2 Dynamic Game
At any time t the dynamic problem of the two ￿rms is to choose simultaneously the optimal
characteristics levels that maximize their expected present value of net cash ￿ ows given the state
of the economy (si;￿1;s￿i;￿1;e). Firms choose their amount of characteristics simultaneously
after the exchange rate shock is realized. Both ￿rms have complete information on the realization
of the shock and on their own and their competitor￿ s costs. The intertemporal problem of the



















For any given si;t the distribution used to form expectation in (5) can be derived from the
￿rm￿ s perception of the Markov transition kernel for its competitor, and the controlled Markov
stated in (3). This formulation has a stationary Markovian structure. That is the current
states (si;￿1;s￿i;￿1;e) and the current decision, si are su¢ cient to determine the evolution to
8the next state (si;s￿i;e0). This implies that for each of the two ￿rms the optimal characteristics
strategies, if it exists, can be chosen from the class of stationary Markov strategies. Therefore
the optimal characteristics choice can be de￿ned as Gi(si;￿1;s￿i;￿1;e); that means that charac-
teristics are stationary function of only the current state (si;￿1;s￿i;￿1;e): This means that the
problem can be formulated as a recursive problem and if a solution exists to the ￿rm￿ s problem







s:t: s￿i = G￿i(si;￿1;s￿i;￿1;e) (7)
Therefore, in any state, for each ￿rm, the optimal policy involves choosing a level of character-
istics that maximizes the above Bellman equation given the symmetric policy function of the
competitor.
4.2.3 The Equilibrium
I study the dynamic equilibrium of the market arising from the competitive interaction between
the domestic and foreign ￿rms. The equilibrium is one of ￿rational expectation￿ , in the sense
that, in equilibrium, the beliefs of ￿rm i on the optimal decisions of its competitor, must be
equal to ￿rm ￿i true policy function. The two ￿rms solve a dynamic programming problem
that is interdependent only through the states of the economy (si;￿1;s￿i;￿1;e), such that their
quality strategies remain optimal at every state, regardless of how that state was reached,
against the optimal decision of the competitor. Thus we can say that the equilibrium is also a
Markov-Perfect Nash Equilibrium in the sense of Maskin and Tirole (1988) and (2001). Given
Assumptions (A.4)-(A.7) and equation (3) we can therefore de￿ne:
DEFINITION 8(si;￿1;s￿i;￿1;e) 2 ￿ The Markov Perfect Equilibrium for this market is
given by a pair of value functions Vi(si;￿1;s￿i;￿1;e) and a pair of policy function Gi(si;￿1;s￿i;￿1;e)
such that:
1. Given G￿i(si;￿1;s￿i;￿1;e), Vi(si;￿1;s￿i;￿1;e) satis￿es (6);







Given our de￿nition of the equilibrium we want now to show that the equilibrium exists and
is unique;
Proposition 2 Consider the ￿rm decision problem (6). 8si 2 [si;si] ￿ S and 8e 2 [e;e] ￿ E
under the Assumptions (A.4)-(A.7):
a. there exist a unique Vi(si;￿1;s￿i;￿1;e); V : R3
+ ! R+ , monotonic increasing in si; uniformly
bounded, and satisfying (6);
b. there exist a unique optimal policy function, Gi(si;￿1;s￿i;￿1;e); G : R3
+ ! R+:
9Proof. a. Monotonicity:














Take an a ￿ 0: We have:


















= TVi(si;￿1;s￿i;￿1;e) + ￿a
that satis￿es the discounting property.
b. The proof of uniqueness of the policy function Gi(si;￿1;s￿i;￿1;e) is straightforward since
the concavity of the one period return with respect to the endogenous state variable ensures that
the sequence of approximated policy function fGng converges to the optimal policy function
Gi(si;￿1;s￿i;￿1;e):
5 Results
In this section I describe the main results of the model. The algorithm I have used to solve the
model is described in appendix (A). The results discussed in this section have an absolute error
of 10￿9 and a relative error of 10￿8: Solving for the optimal policy function of the two ￿rms
show that the characteristics choice of each ￿rm depends positively on their previous period
characteristics, and negatively by the previous period amount of competitor￿ s characteristics.
The ￿rst result can be explained by the presence of adjustment costs, the second by the fact
that ￿rms tend to slightly di⁄erentiate their products also on the characteristics dimension.
The exchange rate value a⁄ect positively the amount of characteristics of the domestic ￿rm and
negatively that of foreign ￿rm. Indeed the higher the exchange rate the higher the costs of the
foreign ￿rm, the more the foreign ￿rm will ￿nd optimal to reduce its characteristics content in
order to reduce its costs.
I have performed an impulse response analysis of a one percent depreciation of the domestic
exchange rate. I have analyzed a symmetric equilibrium in which, before the shock, the two ￿rms
have the same costs, prices and characteristics. In order to analyze the role of the persistence
of the shock, I have analyzed a case in which ￿ = 0:7; de￿ned as high persistency, and a case
in which ￿ = 0:2; de￿ned as low persistency. The pictures of the impulse responses are in
Appendix (C.1) and Appendix (C.2) respectively.
The results obtained using two di⁄erent presidencies are qualitatively the same. Comparing
the results for ￿ = 0:2 with those for ￿ = 0:7 one can see that in the ￿rst case the economy
comes back to the steady state much quicker and characteristics, prices and market shares react
less than in the case of ￿ = 0:7: This result highlights the importance of the persistence of the
10shock, showing that the bigger is the persistence of the shock, the bigger are the e⁄ects on the
economy. The results reported in the two Appendix are robust to a sensitivity analysis on ￿x
and adjustment costs.
For a given level of characteristics, a depreciation of the exchange rate increases the marginal
costs of foreign ￿rm expressed in domestic currency. The impulse response shows that the foreign
￿rm reduces the amount of characteristics while increases the prices. The domestic ￿rm slightly
increases the characteristics level and increases more the price. Overall the two ￿rms increase
prices less than in the case in which characteristics stay constant, leading to a smaller exchange
rate pass-through than the standard models with strategic interaction. The domestic ￿rm￿ s
market shares increase more than the standard duopoly models. This e⁄ect is due to the fact
that consumers observe the goods￿characteristics and reward the domestic ￿rm that does not
vary them. In this case, it is observed an higher degree of expenditure switching even if prices
vary less than in the duopoly models without non-price competition.
The foreign ￿rm decreases the characteristics of the product supplied even if this means a
lower market share with respect to the one it would get not changing its product. Once the
depreciation occurs, marginal revenues, expressed in the foreign currency, reduces. The foreign
producer optimally curbs her pro￿ts reduction, reducing costs. This can be done, by diminishing
the characteristics content of the good. The decrease of the characteristics content, as well as the
increase in prices, have a negative e⁄ect on the foreign ￿rm market shares. This is a mechanism
that shows how it is possible to observe a low degree of exchange rate pass-through together
with an expenditure switching e⁄ect. This result come from the producer costs structure and
from the non-price competition among ￿rms.
6 Conclusion
Empirical evidence show that the exchange rate pass-through to consumer prices is far from
be complete in the short run. This model proposes an explanation of this evidence alternative
to the existing theories. A producer hit by an exchange rate shock, prefers to supply a less
valuable product, instead of increasing its price. When an impulse response is performed the
results show that the foreign ￿rm characteristics react much more than the foreign ￿rm price.
Domestic demand rewards the domestic ￿rm which even if increases its price, keeps constant
or slightly increases its amount of characteristics. Even if prices do not respond much to the
variation of the exchange rate, the dynamics of the model show expenditure switching in favor
of the domestic product, whose currency depreciate.
This result supports the literature that attribute to exchange rate variations the ability
of working as adjustment mechanisms. This adjustment mechanism occurs through the real
channel of product adjustment instead of through the nominal channel of price changes. These
results suggest that non-price competition is a key element in the analysis of exchange rate
pass-through, and, more in general, costs pass-through.
The model can be extended in several directions. Currently I am solving the model in a
general equilibrium framework, and I am providing some empirical evidence to this mechanism.




In this section I report the solution of the model and the impulse response functions of a one
percent depreciation of the nominal bilateral exchange rate. In order to analyze the dynamics
of the model I must ￿nd the policy functions Gi and G￿i of the two ￿rms. The usual way of
solving dynamic game is implementing the Linear Quadratic algorithm (L-Q). In order to solve
the L-Q algorithm, the one period return function must be quadratic, or, if it is not, it should
be possible to determine the deterministic steady state before the algorithm is computed in
order to compute the second order Taylor approximation around it to reshape the problem in
a quadratic form. The one period return function of the problem described above neither can
be expressed as quadratic, nor is possible to know a priori the steady-state equilibrium around
which make the Taylor expansion, I therefore use the collocation method to solve the model. I
describe in the next subsection the algorithm used to ￿nd the policy functions.
A.1 The Algorithm
The collocation method gives a straightforward strategy to solve functional equations. Using
the collocation method the policy functions of the two ￿rms can be considered as an unknown









where the policy function is expressed as a linear combination of a set of n linearly independent
basis functions ’j1j2j3 and dj1j2j3 basis coe¢ cients that are the unknowns of the function. In
tensor notation, the approximant can be written:
b G￿i(si;￿1;s￿i;￿1;e) =
￿
￿i(si) ￿ ￿￿i(s￿i) ￿ ￿e(e)
￿
d
where d is an￿1 column vector and each ￿￿ is the 1￿n￿ row vector of basis functions over the
dimension ￿. n =
l Y
￿=1
n￿ basis coe¢ cients are ￿xed by requiring the approximant to satisfy the
functional equation, not at all possible points of the domain, but rather at n prescribed point
in the approximation space called the collocation nodes. Given the multivariate nature of the
problem and the values of the relative residual function that I obtain, I report the results that
I get for n￿ = 2 for each of the states of the economy. n￿ = 2 for each of the states implies eight
collocation nodes, and eight unknown basis coe¢ cients for each policy function.
Step 1: De￿nition of functional forms and parameter values. In order to solve the
￿rms￿maximization problem, I need to specify functional forms for the model. Marginal and
￿xed costs functional equations are de￿ned as:
C(si;t;et) =
￿
cisi;t for i = d
c￿
isi;tet for i = f
Ai;t(si;t) = ais2
i;t for i = d;f:
12Foreign ￿rm￿ s marginal costs are expressed in foreign currency, while foreign ￿rm￿ s ￿x costs
are expressed in domestic currency. This speci￿cation allows to analyze just the e⁄ects that an
exchange rate shock has on the spot market. If both the foreign ￿rm￿ s costs of adjustment and
the ￿x costs were expressed in foreign currency, the foreign ￿rm￿ s decision of changing charac-
teristics would depend exclusively on the importance of these costs with respect to revenues.
Also in the case of a small depreciation, the costs of selling high characteristics goods would be
not compensate by the associated revenues, and foreign ￿rm will always decrease the amount of
characteristics. When only marginal costs are function of the exchange rate instead, I am able
to capture how selling an extra unit of the good in the domestic market increase the costs of the
foreign ￿rm, and thus to consider only the direct e⁄ect of selling an extra unit of characteristics.
In each period, given the costs speci￿cation, the concavity of Ri is guaranteed if:
(1 ￿ ci)2 < 18￿(ai + B)e with e = 1 if i = d:
The parameter values have been chosen in order that Assumption (A.1)-(A.7) hold given the
functional forms of the model and the above condition on the concavity of the one period return
holds as well.
Step 2: De￿nition of the approximation space. I have to de￿ne a compact set of (si;s￿i;e)
pairs over which solve the algorithm. The choice consists in four parameters s, s, e, e: The choice
of the upper and lower bound of s must be done in order to obtain a steady state value that is
contained in the interval, similarly for the value of e.
Step 3: Computation of the Euler equations. Once the control variable of the competitor
is de￿ned as the unknown function, I compute the Euler equations of the two ￿rms. For each
￿rm the Euler equation is equal to:
0 =
(si(1 ￿ cisi;t) + G￿i(si;￿1;s￿i;￿1;e)(c￿iet ￿ 1) + 3￿)
18￿
￿ aisi;t ￿ B(si ￿ si;￿1) +
￿Et
￿￿







I thus obtain a system of two equations (the two Euler), in two unknowns (the two policy
functions). In each Euler equation I approximate the expectation operator using a Gauss-
Hermite quadrature choosing the number of nodes equal two.8
Step 4: Solution of the collocation equations I solve the collocation equations in order to
￿nd the given Chebicev nodes.
Step 5: Computation of the basis coe¢ cients. Given the Euler equations evaluated at
the Chebicev nodes, I ￿nd, by Newton￿ s method, the sixteen basis coe¢ cients that solve for the
zeros of the equations.
B Time Consistency
In this subsection I analyze the conditions under which assumption (A.1) holds in the static and
the dynamic game; this is equivalent to say that when ￿rms have the possibility of reoptimize
their characteristics in the dynamic game, they choose an amount of characteristics that satis￿es
8A higher number of nodes does not change the results and the relative error.
13assumption (A.1). In the dynamic game ￿rms could ￿nd pro￿table to deviate from assumption
(A.1), reducing their characteristics and hence their marginal costs such that assumption (A.1)
does not hold anymore; in this occurrence the ￿rm that deviates becomes the monopolist. This
scenario however does not realize if the following assumptions hold:
A.2 1 > Ci(si;e);

















(A.2) follows from the static maximization problem of the ￿rms and guarantees that ￿i(e;g (s￿i);si)
is strictly increasing in si. This assumption leads to the possibility of observing in equilibrium
a characteristics level di⁄erent from the lowest possible level. If the intratemporal pro￿ts were
decreasing in si indeed, ￿rms would o⁄er always the lowest possible characteristics and it would
never be observed characteristics changes.
(A.3) follows from (A.1) and (A.2), and relates the expected stream of pro￿t of a ￿rm that
reduces its characteristics in order to be the monopolist in the market (L.H.S.), and the expected
stream of pro￿ts of a ￿rm always playing a duopoly in the highest possible characteristics
level (R.H.S.). It is assumed that given the realization of the exchange rate, once a ￿rm
chooses a characteristics lower than the highest possible in order to get the monopoly pro￿ts
(RM
i;t(si;t￿1;s￿i;t￿1;et;si;t)), the ￿rm gets them for just one period but from the next period on,
it receives the lowest possible characteristics duopoly pro￿ts. This is due to the reaction of the
￿rm that has not deviate by the duopoly strategy who punish the competitor supplying the
lowest possible characteristics for ever (RD
i;t(si;t￿1;s￿i;t￿1;et;si;t)).
Even when an exchange rate shock occurs such that assumption (A.1) does not hold anymore,
the ￿rms￿best strategy is to choose a new level of characteristics that restores assumption (A.1).
Suppose that after a large depreciation of the exchange rate, foreign ￿rm￿ s marginal costs are
too high with respect to those of the domestic ￿rms, to compete in the market. In order to sell
a positive quantity, the foreign ￿rm will reduce its amount of characteristics, but by (A.2) and
(A.3), it will choose the highest possible characteristics level compatible with the new value of
the nominal bilateral exchange rate. On the other hand, due to assumption (A.3) the domestic
￿rm, whose marginal costs are not increased, cannot do better than choose a new characteristics












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































[1] Blinder, A. S., E. R.D. Canetti, D. E. Lebow and J. B. Rudd, (1998). "Asking about Prices:
A New Approach to Understanding Price Stickiness", New York: Russell.
[2] Burstein, A. T., Neves, J. C., Rebelo S. (2003). ￿Distribution Costs and Real Exchange Rate
Dynamics during Exchange-Rate-Based Stabilization.￿ Journal of Monetary Economics,
(50), 1189-1214.
[3] Campa, J. M., Goldberg L. S. (2002). ￿Exchange Rate Pass-Through Into Import Prices:
A Macro or Micro Phenomenon?.￿NBER Working Paper no. 8934.
[4] Campa, J. M., Goldberg L. S. (2006). ￿Distribution Margins, Imported inputs, and the
Sensitivity of the CPI to Exchange Rates.￿NBER Working Paper no. 12121.
[5] Corsetti, G., Dedola, L., (2003). ￿Macroeconomics of International Price Discrimination￿
CEPR Discussion Papers 3710, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[6] Crucini, M. J, Telmer C. I., Zachariadis M. (2001). ￿Understanding European Real Ex-
change Rates￿Working Papers 0120, department of Economics, Vanderbilt University.
[7] Debelle, G., Galati, G., (2005). ￿Current Account Adjustment and Capital Flows￿ BIS
Working Paper, No. 169.
[8] Devereux, M. B., Engel, C. (2003). ￿Monetary Policy in the Open Economy Revisited:
Price Setting and Exchange-Rate Flexibility￿Review of Economic Studies, vol. 70(4), 765-
783, October.
[9] Engel, C., (2002). "Expenditure Switching and Exchange Rate Policy," NBER Macroeco-
nomics Annual 2002, no. 17, 231-272.
[10] Engel, C., Rogers, J. H, (1996). ￿How Wide Is the Border?￿American Economic Review,
vol. 86(5), 1112-25, December.
[11] Faruqee, H., (2006). ￿Exchange Rate Pass-Through in the Euro Area￿ , IMF Sta⁄ Papers,
vol. 53 (1).
[12] Freund, C., L. (2000). ￿Current Account Adjustment in Industrialized Countries￿ , Inter-
national Finance Discussion Papers, No. 692.
[13] Koelln, K. A., Rush, M. (1993). ￿Rigid Prices and Flexible Products,￿ Journal of Eco-
nomics, 19, 57-64, Spring.
[14] Krugman, P. (1991). ￿Has the Adjustment Process Worked?￿in International Adjustment
and Financing: The Lessons from 1985-1991, ed. by C. Fred Bergsten (Washington: Insti-
tute for International Economics).
[15] Maskin, E. and Tirole, J. (1988), ￿A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly: I & II￿ , Econometrica,
56, 549-600.
[16] Maskin, E. and Tirole, J. (2001), ￿Markov Perfect Equilibria: I Observable Actions￿ ,
Journal of Economic Theory, 100(2), 191-219, October.
17[17] Obstfeld, M., (2001). ￿International Macroeconomics: Beyond the Mundell-Fleming
Model￿ , IMF Sta⁄ Papers, vol. 47 Special Issue.
[18] Rocko⁄, H. (1984). ￿Drastic Measures: A History of Wage and Price Controls in the United
States￿ . New York, Cambridge University Press.
[19] Rotemberg, Julio J. "Customer Anger at Price Increases, Changes in the Frequency of
Price Adjustment and Monetary Policy." Journal of Monetary Economics 52, no. 4 (May
2005): 829-852.
18